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Abstract 
Concerns about the future of creation order 
The theological background to the notion of the law of nature/ 
creation order is indispensable to the reformational tradition, 
which recognises that these laws are the Creator‟s will, and 
therefore holds a “necessity” view of these laws. There has, 
however, been a longstanding debate about the nature of law 
within the reformational tradition, where its origin and its status 
as boundary between God and creation have been questioned. 
In this article I will investigate how Trinitarian theology, speci-
fically that of Robert W. Jenson, relates to process philosophy 
and theology, and how together they create some theological 
concerns about the future of creation order. Some of the con-
cerns include the following: that the necessity of order is ques-
tioned (the disappearance of a Creator who wills these laws); 
that order is temporal and in constant change; and that the 
boundary between God and creation is weakened. I will raise 
some objections to these aspects, but will also highlight some 
questions the reformational tradition has to answer in terms of 
its understanding of the immanence of God and of the impli-
cated theological basis for the creation order. These questions 
are of the utmost importance for the understanding of the future 
of creation order.  
Opsomming 
Besorgdheid oor die toekoms van skeppingsorde 
Die teologiese agtergrond van die idee van ‟n skeppingsorde is 
onontbeerlik vir die reformatoriese tradisie. Volgens hierdie tra-
disie is die natuurwette die Skepper se wil en daarom word 
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hierdie orde as noodsaaklik beskou. ‟n Voortslepende debat 
binne die reformatoriese tradisie bestaan egter lank reeds ten 
opsigte van die aard van die skeppingsordening, waarvolgens 
die oorsprong en status daarvan as skeiding tussen God en die 
skepping bevraagteken word. Ek gaan in hierdie artikel onder-
soek instel na die Trinitariese teologie, spesifiek hoe dié van 
Robert W. Jenson verband hou met prosesfilosofie en -teologie, 
asook hoe dit gesamentlik sekere teologiese bekommernise oor 
die toekoms van ‟n skeppingsorde laat ontstaan. Sommige van 
hierdie kwessies sluit in dat die noodsaaklikheid van ‟n skep-
pingsorde bevraagteken word (die verdwyning van ‟n Skepper 
wat hierdie ordeninge wil); dat orde tydelik is en gedurig ver-
ander; en dat die grens tussen God en skepping vervaag. Ek 
sal sekere besware oor hierdie kwessies opper, maar ek sal 
ook sekere vrae uitlig wat die reformatoriese tradisie moet 
beantwoord in terme van hulle begrip van die immanensie van 
God en van die geïmpliseerde teologiese grondslag van die 
skeppingsorde. Hierdie vrae is van die uiterste belang vir insig 
oor die toekoms van ‟n skeppingsorde. 
1. Introduction 
The question posed in this article concerns the future of creation 
order.1 Does creation order have a future? To answer this, I will first 
look at the theological basis of creation order. My hypothesis is that 
the future of creation order might come under significant threat if its 
theological basis is undermined. The necessity of creation order is 
thus a notion that I develop in part one, while in part two I connect 
the opposite of this notion, namely probability, to process philosophy 
and theology. In part three I draw a link between process philosophy 
                                      
1 The concept creation order will be used to emphasise that God willed this order 
(laws of nature) as Creator. In some instances “laws of nature” will be used to 
emphasise the “natural” aspects of these laws, but in most cases the terms will 
be used interchangeably.  
 Creation order is thus understood here primarily as laws of nature and not in the 
broader sense as defined by reformational philosophy – reformational philo-
sophy never restricted creation order to natural laws, because it acknowledges 
also ontic normativity as part of the creation order. Dooyeweerd has for example 
an encompassing idea of the creation order, including both natural laws and the 
creational principles guiding human activities – in a functional and a typical 
sense.  
 This article will not focus on this reformational philosophical view of creation 
order per se, but the implications might be relevant for this tradition in the sense 
that it also distinguishes God from creation. Due to space constraints, further 
analysis of this point will have to wait for a follow-up article. 
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and Trinitarian theology in an effort to reconsider the value of pro-
cess philosophy in thinking about creation order. This is necessary 
because in reformational theology, process theology has been much 
criticised and its legitimate aspects are perhaps not emphasised 
enough. Lastly, I will indicate the challenges all of this has for the 
future of creation order. My conclusion is in more than one sense an 
open one. 
2. The theological basis for creation order 
Without a proper basis any theory is suspect, and it is therefore of 
the utmost importance to investigate the theological basis of creation 
order. In the reformational tradition2 the notion of the laws of nature 
as something God-given is indispensable. In this tradition God is 
understood as the Creator who has created this order and who wills 
these laws. When for example, Jacob Klapwijk in his book Purpose 
in the living world? Creation and emergent evolution (2008) asks if 
there is such a thing as divine creation order, he says it cannot be 
answered by science. He says the belief in a creation order is some-
thing a believing person (a Christian in this case) could be reassured 
of by reading Psalm 19. Klapwijk (2008:237) adds that  
... the Christian church has confessed, through the ages, its 
faith in God as the almighty creator of heaven and earth, who 
upholds His creation, and who also makes life livable by 
subjecting it to His ordinances.  
The philosopher John Polkinghorne follows the same line of thought 
as Klapwijk when he states that science does not have sufficient 
ability to explain the nature of the order that we find in the physical 
world. He says:  
The rationally transparent and beautiful principles of order 
already discerned as shaping cosmic process have a character 
that seems to call for further explanatory insight lying beyond 
that which science on its own can provide. (Polkinghorne, 
2008:192.)  
                                      
2 “Reformational tradition” here includes both the philosophical and the 
theological traditions as far as both posit creation as something other than God, 
and thus maintain a distinction between Creator and creation. This article‟s aim 
is therefore not to engage primarily with the tradition of reformational philosophy 
as initiated by Dooyeweerd, but with the reformational tradition in the broader 
sense. 
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He further argues that to treat the structure of the universe as “mere-
ly a happy accident” would seem to be both implausible and intel-
lectually supine, and therefore he also chooses an explanation that 
refers to God and religion. Polkinghorne (2008:192) concludes that 
“Religious insights ... offer a more profound context within which to 
consider these matters”. He adds that a religious understanding of 
the creation order also allows for concepts like value and purpose to 
be used when talking about the universe – something which natural 
science often does not have room for to acknowledge.  
The history of the idea of the laws of nature shows that the concept 
of laws of nature was initially based on theological assumptions, but 
it has increasingly been maintained without such assumptions. Peter 
Harrison, in his book The development of the concept of the Laws of 
Nature (2008), describes that the laws of nature (the remarkable 
features of the physical universe to conform to mathematical laws) 
are not simply descriptions of regularities, but “rather they dictate 
how things must be ... some kind of natural necessity” (Harrison, 
2008:13). He explains that the idea of a world governed by laws of 
nature, as a result of God‟s direct involvement in the operations of 
nature, developed since the seventeenth century. The laws are 
mathematical because “God was conceptualized as the divine 
mathematician” and the laws were a necessity because they “arise 
out of the fact that God‟s will is immutable, and hence the laws that 
he wills into effect are unchangeable” (Harrison, 2008:28).  
The answer to the question as to why there are laws of nature at all 
therefore involved a theological commitment. According to Harrison, 
things changed in the nineteenth century when “laws of nature came 
to be regarded not as laws imposed on nature by God, but literally 
as laws of nature itself” (Harrison, 2008:28). These laws were now 
referred to as “laws of science” or “scientific laws”, which indicate 
the elevated status of science and the corresponding decline in the 
emphasis on God‟s role in the instantiation of natural laws. In the 
twentieth century the idea of laws of nature was thus separated from 
its original theistic justifications and given a wider application, but it 
has also lost its deterministic and theistic connotations. The 
implication of this changed application for contemporary philosophy 
is one of division and confusion about the laws of nature: some 
assert that they capture some necessary state of affairs; others see 
them as significantly mind-dependent; and yet others find the pro-
blems associated with these views insurmountable and assert that 
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there is simply no such thing as laws of nature.3 Harrison‟s con-
clusion is that this confusion resulted from the fact that the idea (of 
laws of nature) has been separated from its theological commitment. 
Philip Clayton, in his Contemporary philosophical concepts of law 
and nature: the quest for broad explanatory consonance (2008) links 
up with Harrison‟s argument about the need for laws of nature to be 
understood in terms of religious beliefs. He asks the question if it 
could be that the laws of nature have not only a physical, but also a 
theological story to tell. He adds that the status of natural laws is a 
topic of vital interest to science-religion debates and he shows the 
comparisons between them in this regard: where science speaks of 
nature, theologians speaks of creation; science presupposes the 
fundamental constants as given, while theological doctrines hold 
that lawlike regularities in the natural world depend on the ongoing 
divine will. Clayton says that the theological traditions include at 
least three major positions on the topic of natural law, namely laws 
as eternal necessities, laws as necessities “imposed upon the world 
by divine choice, which become binding once God has decided upon 
them”; and laws as patterns that humans discern which “are sig-
nificant but nonetheless open to change as God acts in novel ways 
within the world” (Clayton, 2008:39). According to the first two views, 
God has established certain laws right at the moment of creation, 
but the third view holds that God is not presently bound by any 
decisions.4 The implication of this third view is that there is some 
order in the natural world, but this order does not constrain future 
divine action in any significant way – God is completely free to 
change them.5 Clayton (2008:40) states that according to this third 
view  
... scientists may well speak of „laws‟, but all that term can really 
mean is that we discern regularities in the natural order at the 
                                      
3 Armstrong is representative of this view. He holds that laws of nature describe a 
relation between two universals and says for example: “… to have drawn this 
consequence is already to have produced a good reason for denying that the 
laws of nature are strongly necessary. For I maintain that universals are just as 
much contingent beings as particulars are.” (Armstrong, 1983:164.) 
4 This view goes back to Ockham‟s nominalism and his idea of God‟s potestas 
Dei absoluta. 
5 The position assumed by Calvin was that God is not subject to his laws for 
creation, but it is also not arbitrary, for in his providential plan He holds Himself 
to what He ordained: Deus legibus solutes est, sed non exlex. 
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present ... New „laws‟ emerge when God changes God‟s pat-
terns of activity.  
A distinction is thus made between the “regularity” and “necessity” 
views of the laws of nature. It is important (at least for the argument 
of this article) to find clarity regarding this distinction.  
The regularity view accepts a picture of natural laws freed from any 
necessity, and free from any metaphysics. David Hume6 argues, for 
example, that natural laws are nothing more than the description of 
patterns that have arisen in the past and will (as far as we know) 
continue into the future. Therefore there is no necessity that links a 
cause to its effect – nature does not know cause and effect. We may 
sometimes feel there is a relation of necessity between two things, 
but according to Hume it is merely a psychological fact about us. 
The regularity theory suffers from a serious problem, as it appears to 
make it impossible for laws to actually explain anything because 
there is no metaphysical link to the generalisation. On the regularity 
view, what exist ultimately are individuals (Clayton, 2008:48). In 
contrast, the necessity view discerns stronger connections with the 
natural world and states that “natural laws seem to have a normative 
force: they tell us not merely how things happen to have been so far, 
but how things must be” (Clayton, 2008:44). The necessity view 
seeks to ground the necessities expressed by physical laws in 
something deeper than individuals, in something more metaphysical. 
For example, laws like the law of gravity holds necessarily because 
it is metaphysically true that a large number of events share the 
same set of core properties, they are instances of one general law. 
These patterns might be established by a divinely established law, 
or they can, for example, form part of the world that consists “en-
tirely of relations” (Clayton, 2008:48). For Clayton, the regularity 
view is misguided on this point because it treats the objects of our 
experience as separate objects, when they are in fact part of more 
fundamental forces. He argues that the necessity view is the more 
correct view to have. In his argument he refers to Ayer, who notes 
that “our present use of the expression „laws of nature‟ carries traces 
of the conception of Nature as subject to command” (Ayer, 1998: 
809). In other words “laws of nature” does not only include the idea 
of pattern, but the way things must be. Clayton sees this association 
                                      
6 David Hume is the classic exponent of this regularity view and the greatest 
challenge to any metaphysical component in natural laws is the Humean 
objection – see in this regard Hume‟s Enquiries concerning the human 
understanding and concerning the principles of morals (1902). 
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as an intrinsic one and says that “science can only explain phe-
nomena when it recognizes (rather than creates) deeper connec-
tions that underlie our empirical observations and make them what 
they are” (Clayton, 2008:50). Thus, for Clayton laws of nature are 
necessities in that they express intrinsic connections within nature 
which we do not create but perceive within nature itself. He chooses 
this view above the regularities view, as part of his quest for broad 
explanatory consonance between one‟s religious standpoint, the 
scientific data, and their implications.7 Clayton‟s conclusion is that 
the theist who accepts the necessity view of natural law (which he 
defends) can view these necessary connections as established by 
God. He says:  
If there is a Creator God, as theists maintain, and there are 
invariant lawlike connections in the natural world, then it is 
much more natural to assume that the nature of the Creator is 
reflected in the nature of the created world. (Clayton, 2008:55.) 
Clayton‟s conclusion brings me back to the fact that the concept of 
creation order or laws of nature reflects confidence and trust in God, 
as the One who wills and maintains these laws. Furthermore, the 
reformational tradition, which holds the view that the Creator is 
willing these laws, therefore, holds a necessity view of these laws. 
According to Clayton‟s and Harrison‟s arguments this is the proper 
way to understand them.8 There has, however, been a longstanding 
debate over the nature of law within this tradition, where its origin 
and its status as boundary between God and creation have been 
questioned. Although both scholastic metaphysics and Deism have 
been rejected within the reformational tradition, the question still 
remains how the immanence of God should be understood, es-
pecially in relation to the theological basis of the nature of creation 
order.9 On this aspect I will now focus my argument. 
                                      
7 Space prevents me from explaining the whole argument of Clayton here, but in 
short he uses the criteria of systematicity and internal coherence to evaluate the 
different proposals on four different philosophical levels. 
8 The unstated implication of Harrison‟s argument seems to be that if the 
necessity view of laws of nature is not accepted, the whole idea of such a 
concept might be given up because of the confusion and division it then creates. 
9 It should, however, be kept in mind that within the reformational philosophical 
tradition creation order is something ontically given and therefore it cannot have 
a “theological basis”. See in this regard Dooyeweerd‟s A new critique of theo-
retical thought (1958) and Strauss‟s Philosophy: discipline of the disciplines 
(2009).  
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3. Creation order and process philosophy/theology 
Within the reformational tradition the laws of nature are seen as the 
creation order, something willed by God and something that is a 
necessity. The underlying assumption in this understanding is that 
God is the Creator, and for Him to create is to bring something into 
existence which is separate from Himself – in other words every-
thing other than God Himself is creation.10 However, creation is not 
to be understood solely in terms of what happened initially. This 
would neglect the continuing nature of God‟s work of creation and 
lead to the heresy of deistic thinking. Deism has been rejected within 
the reformational tradition, and creation is rather understood as 
God‟s continuing creation in the sense that He maintains his crea-
tion and that He gives purpose to it.11 Exactly how God‟s imma-
nence should be understood within this picture (of Creator funda-
mentally distinct from his creation, and with laws of nature as neces-
sities) is something theologians disagree about.  
Fraser Watts, in his Concepts of law and probability in theology and 
science (2008) says theologians are pulled in conflicting directions 
about the laws of nature. On the one hand they want to emphasise 
the lawfulness of nature as reflection of God‟s faithfulness, and on 
the other hand they want to emphasise the openness of creation as 
reflecting God‟s continuing initiative. Some will say “God does not 
play dice” (like Einstein) and that God set the laws of nature to be 
unchangeable and necessary. The problem then is how God can 
interact in the world without breaking or changing these laws. (If He 
only maintains them He might be seen as Deistic.) Therefore, others 
would maintain that there are other possibilities for God to act in the 
world (for example to respond to prayer) than just maintaining the 
laws of nature. They will probably accept “a softer view of the laws 
of nature” (Watts, 2008:2), which can make it easier to see how 
divine action can be reconciled with laws of nature without those 
laws being violated. This “softer view” seems, however, to be a 
move away from the necessity view of laws of nature to the regu-
larity view, but this would be in conflict with the reformational tradi-
tion‟s view about the laws of nature. An alternative should therefore 
                                      
10 The theologian Karl Barth says: “God creates and therefore gives reality to 
another alongside and outside himself …” (1964:41). This is in line with the 
reformational theologians like Luther and Calvin. 
11 Klapwijk says “the creation order has a conserving and a prophetic content. It 
speaks of God‟s purpose from of old, and of its intentions for the present and 
the future” (2008:237, footnote 4). 
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be investigated and in this endeavour Watts‟s distinction between 
law and probability is helpful. 
Watts (2008:2) states that the lawfulness of nature came to have 
overtones of determinism during the Enlightenment. Laws of nature 
may thus be seen as closely related to both determinism and neces-
sity. Determinism has probably been more prominent in philosophy 
of science, and necessity more in philosophical theology. Watts dis-
cusses chance, unpredictability and probability as opposite terms to 
lawfulness, necessity and determinism. He shows that law and pro-
bability may not be mutually exclusive, but that they in fact have a 
conceptual interconnectedness between them (one is parasitic on 
the other and cannot be defined without the other). The concept of 
probability is, for Watts, much closer to lawfulness than is either 
chance or unpredictability. He explains:  
It is a reasonable extension of the concept of the lawfulness of 
the natural world to include probabilistic laws as well as ab-
solute ones. The key difference is perhaps that predictions from 
absolute laws are necessary, whereas predictions from probabi-
listic laws are contingent. Probability combines an element of 
predictability with an element of openness. (Watts, 2008:5.)  
Laws of nature therefore include both absolute laws (with necessary 
predictions) and probabilistic laws (with contingent predictions). 
These probabilistic laws allow openness (as opposed to predictabi-
lity), “emergence” (as chaos theory has shown order can arise “at 
the edge of chaos”) and a degree of freedom (something that can 
emerge at one level from determinism at a lower level). Probability 
thus opens up the possibility within our understanding of laws of 
nature for divine action and a better understanding of God‟s imma-
nence. The implication is that the universe is not to be understood 
with only “fixed elements of general structure; but it is an open and 
developing system – so it is open at many points to creative change” 
(Ward, 2008a:37).  
We can accordingly say that God‟s primal action of creation is the 
positing of a universe with general structural necessities (laws of 
nature); but this does not exclude further divine actions, especially 
not acts at the points of the contingent process where the open 
universe invites it. Keith Ward, in his book Divine action: examining 
God‟s role in an open and emergent universe (2008a) declares that 
the  
... universe is open at many points to the influence of Divine 
and human choices ... within parameters of necessity ... in ways 
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which affect the future, determining it to be in a state which 
might otherwise have been different (Ward, 2008a:74).  
Divine action (or immanence) understood in this way, is very much 
in accord with the way process philosophy understands God. Alfred 
North Whitehead (who can be regarded as the father of process 
philosophy), for example, views God as “a constantly new creator, 
bringing new things into being, in a time that flies toward an open 
future but a future that is always governed by having its ultimate 
goal in God” (Ward, 2008b:251). God has as a result a very creative 
role and acts not only as the source of cosmic order. In Whitehead‟s 
process philosophy the world  
... never reaches completion and neither does God, for both are 
in the grip of the ultimate ground, creativity. God is not a being 
hypostatized before creation; rather, divine reality is always in 
process with creation. (Dorrien, 2008:318.)12  
In process thought the metaphysical claim is consequently that 
becoming is more elemental than being, because reality is funda-
mentally temporal and creative. Therefore, in Whitehead‟s philo-
sophy, finite persons are societies of small events or “actual occa-
sions”, each one existing for a moment, integrating its direct past 
and projecting creatively into its immediate future. God is then the 
“Ideal Goal, causally influencing but not determining things toward 
their ultimate goal of union with the Divine” (Ward, 2008b:252). For 
Whitehead, God experiences all the feelings of finite beings and 
includes them in the Divine Being. Process theologians describe this 
by “speaking of all finite experiences as „included in‟ God. Thus 
Charles Hartshorne says that God is „world-inclusive, having all 
things as constituents‟.” (Ward, 2008a:25.) This is why process theo-
logians are generally regarded as panentheists. 
To summarise and to link up with my argument again, we must say 
that within process philosophy (and theology) God is seen as the 
creative counterpart from the inception of the development process 
                                      
12 According to Cobb and Griffin (1976:59), “[p]rocess theology understands God 
precisely as the basic source of unrest in the universe”. This shows the 
willingness of process thought to embrace tension and a degree of conflict. 
William Hasker (2005:192) says:  
For process theism, the ultimate divine aim is for enjoyment – by the 
creatures, and by God himself. Enjoyment requires both order and 
novelty. Without order, chaos reigns and significant enjoyment is 
impossible, but without the constant infusion of novelty, order 
stagnates and enjoyment remains at a stage of unnecessary triviality.  
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of creation. This view has the implication of a pantheistic view of 
God, one in which He participates in reality, as being part of that 
reality. Such an understanding of God‟s immanence has the im-
plication of creation order (laws of nature) being temporal and in-
evitably being in constant change (or has at least the ability to be). 
The question that may follow is what the status of creation order is, 
and whether it is still meaningful to speak about laws of nature, es-
pecially as necessities. Before these questions are discussed it must 
be mentioned that process philosophy and theology has been criti-
cised by reformational theology on numerous points. Some of the 
critique includes that it is unbiblical and other that God cannot be 
understood in a panentheistic manner. Although much of the critique 
might be fair from a reformational theological view, it should be 
noted that recently there have been new developments, especially in 
Trinitarian theology that supports the main thrust of process theo-
logy from a completely different and much more biblical angle. I will 
discuss this development next, focusing on only one representative 
example, namely the Trinitarian theology of Robert Jenson. 
4. Process philosophy/theology and the Trinitarian 
theology of Robert Jenson13 
Robert Jenson is well-known as a significant and prolific writer on 
Trinitarian theology and eschatology. Jenson is an American Luthe-
ran theologian who for more than 40 years, has written extensively 
and very creatively about the Trinity, time and eternity.14 Some of 
his main works as a Trinitarian theologian include his dogmatic 
works (Jenson, 1997; 1999;15 1969 and 1963). 
Jenson‟s theology is to a great extent a reaction to the Hellenistic 
influences on the early church‟s theology, especially in regard to 
concepts like the impassibility and timelessness of God.16 The very 
                                      
13 This discussion of Jenson‟s theology rests on previous work on this theologian 
(cf. Verhoef, 2011a and 2011b). 
14 Although Jenson is sometimes described as an American theologian, he is well-
known and respected internationally as a theologian. In Gunton‟s book (2000) 
on Jenson, theologians from all over the world and from many different 
denominations contributed essays of appreciation and dialogue with Jenson‟s 
theology. 
15 The theologian Carl Braaten says these books are undoubtedly the crowning 
fulfilment of Jenson‟s career. 
16 Jason Curtis (2005:23) explains: 
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definition of God‟s eternity as “timeless” is something Jenson re-
gards as unbiblical and incompatible with the story of creation and 
redemption.17 God is not timeless, but God is “identified by specific 
temporal actions and is known within certain temporal communities 
by personal names and identifying descriptions thereby provided“ 
(Jenson, 1997:44). God is not timeless, but lively, active, an event. 
Jenson follows Gregory of Nyssa‟s thoughts and says “God ... refers 
to the mutual action of the identities‟ divine „energies‟, to the peri-
choretic life” (Jenson, 1997:214) and “This being of God is not a 
something, however rarefied or immaterial, but a going-on, a se-
quentially palpable event, like a kiss or a train wreck” (Jenson, 
1997:214). This “temporality” of God is described by Jenson as 
God‟s “temporal infinity”. Jenson prefer to use the term infinity (limit-
lessness) instead of timelessness about God, because God is not 
infinite in the sense that he “extends indefinitely, but because no 
temporal activity can keep up with the activity that he is” (Jenson, 
1997:216). God is infinite not by having no boundaries, but by over-
coming the boundaries. Therefore, Jenson asserts that God‟s being 
should be described as temporal infinity. For Jenson this term de-
monstrates God‟s self-liberation from temporal contingencies, with-
out extracting Him from history.  
According to Jenson, this temporal infinity or “timefullness” of God is 
not just something ascribed to God, but it is part of the being of God. 
It is central to the relationships within the Trinity – it defines God. For 
Jenson there is a clear connection between the poles of time and 
the mutual triune roles of Father, Son, and Spirit. According to him, 
the “Father is the „whence‟ of God‟s life; the Spirit is the „whither‟ of 
God‟s life; and ... the Son is that life‟s specious present” (Jenson, 
                                                                                                             
According to Jenson, the Greeks, in an effort toward security of 
existence over against time‟s fleetingness, defined eternity in terms of 
timelessness. Since humanity cannot embrace our past, present, and 
future giving us the coherence of life that we naturally desire, the 
ancient Greeks projected that ability onto God and therefore defined 
deity in terms of persistence or immutability. Jenson asserts that while 
the early church did not simply assimilate Hellenism into its theology, 
it nonetheless failed to rid itself of certain debilitating features, the 
pinnacle of which is the notion of divine timelessness. 
17 Pannenberg (2000:49) says:  
Jenson is surely right in contending that the God of the Bible is 
identified by temporal events, and indeed by a history of such events. 
He boldly integrates this insight with his Trinitarian theology by 
conceiving of the biblical narrative as „the final truth of God‟s own 
reality‟ in the mutual relations of God the Father, His incarnate Son, 
and the eschatological accomplishment of their communion by the 
Spirit. 
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1997:218-219). Thus, for Jenson God possesses a past, present, 
and future in Himself; not only as pure duration (as Karl Barth 
understood it, with no conflict but only peace between source, 
movement and goal), but as a temporal infinity.18 Jenson says God  
... is temporally infinite because „source‟ and „goal‟ are present 
and asymmetrical in him, because he is primally future to him-
self and only thereupon past and present for himself (Jenson, 
1997:217).  
The climax of Jenson‟s theology is that the end will be theosis. 
Jenson says: “God and only God is the creature‟s future. God the 
Spirit is God‟s own future and so draws to and into the triune 
converse those for whom the Trinity makes room” (Jenson, 1999: 
26).19 We can thus say that the unity of Jenson‟s theology lies in the 
fact that the Trinity is temporally defined in relation to the claim that 
God is in fact the mutual life and action of the three persons, Father, 
Son and Spirit, as they move towards the future. This relationship 
between God and time is central to Jenson‟s Trinitarian thought. 
However, the relationship between time and space – and conse-
quently our space in God – needs to be clarified if we want to 
understand what Jenson means by a Trinity that “makes room” for 
us.  
As we have seen, for Jenson time is no longer what separates God 
and the world, instead time is defined as common ground. But, while 
time is something outside us, Jenson states that time is inside the 
divine subjective centre. Jenson follows Augustine‟s description that 
time is  
                                      
18 Jenson agrees with the pure duration of Barth in the sense that “nothing in God 
recedes into the past or approaches from the future” but he differs from Barth 
when he adds: “But the difference is also absolute: the arrow of God‟s eternity, 
like the arrow of casual time, does not reverse itself. Whence and whither in 
God are not like right or left or up and down on a map, but are like before and 
after in a narrative.” (Jenson, 1997:218.) 
19 Pannenberg says that it is at this point where Jenson‟s systematic unity of his 
theology is found:  
... unity is provided by the trinitarian perspective: from the beginning, 
the creation was intended for „inclusion‟ in the triune community by 
virtue of union with Christ, the purpose being a „perfected human 
community‟. That is the promise of the gospel which is anticipated in 
the life of the Church and is finally achieved in the final advent of the 
Kingdom. (Pannenberg, 2000:49.) 
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... the „distention‟ of a personal reality ... That is: the „stretching 
out‟ that makes time is an extension not of finite consciousness 
but of an infinite enveloping consciousness (Jenson, 1999:34).  
So, it is in this “enveloping consciousness” of God that time is 
internal. So it is not outside God, but inside Him, asymmetrical in his 
perichoresis that time exists. 
In addition, for Jenson it is “exactly the divine internality of time that 
is the possibility of creaturehood at all” (Cumin, 2007:173). Here we 
find the strong relationship of time and space when Jenson says:  
... for God to create is for him to make accommodation in his 
triune life for other persons and things than the three whose 
mutual life he is. In himself, he opens room, and that act is the 
event of creation ... We call this accommodation in the triune life 
„time‟... creation is above all God‟s taking time for us (Jenson, 
1999:25).  
Therefore, for Jenson, created time is accommodation in God‟s eter-
nity for those other than God and consequently we can speak about 
God‟s roominess (Jenson, 1999:25). The implication of this is that 
everything appears to exist in God and that there is no other 
possible way for things to exist. For this reason Jenson is often 
accused of panentheism and even “pan-en-trinitarianism”,20 and this 
in turn leads to questions about God‟s aseity or self-sufficiency. The 
problem is that, in Jenson‟s words (2006:33):  
Those on the one side of the argument accuse those on the 
other of so identifying God with history among us as to make 
him dependent on us. Those of the latter party accuse those of 
the former of continuing so to construe eternity by categories 
alien to the biblical account of God – for example, by 
timelessness. 
To summarise: the Trinitarian theology of Jenson places a strong 
emphasis on God‟s “temporality” and Jenson asserts that God is not 
timeless, but “timeful”. This timefulness (or temporal infinity) is not 
only an attribute of God, but forms part of his identity as the Trinity. 
For Jenson, this is the most coherent way of understanding God in 
terms of his biblical revelation. In addition, this understanding of God 
                                      
20 Mark Mattes (2000:484) says for example: “The logic of Jenson‟s view of God is 
led by a conceptual commitment to a „pan-en-trinitarianism‟ in which all histories 
are called to their fulfilment by the very life of the triune God finding itself in, 
with, and under these histories.”  
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and time has implications for the understanding of God‟s space, and 
here lies another strong link with process theology. God is therefore 
connected to creation, not only in his “temporality”, but also in his 
accommodation of creation in Him. From a different (and much more 
biblical) angle we hence arrive at more or less the same conclusion 
about God‟s relationship to the world (and creation order) as did 
process philosophy and theology.  
5. The challenges of process theology and Trinitarian 
theology to the future of creation order 
The Trinitarian theology, especially that of Jenson, stands therefore 
in relation to process philosophy and theology and together it 
creates some serious theological concerns about the future of 
creation order. Before I highlight some of these I want to recap on 
my argument so far. The first part states the importance of the theo-
logical basis for creation order. An important aspect of the theo-
logical basis is that laws of nature are seen as necessities: they are 
normative (they dictate how things should be). If the laws of nature 
were understood only as regularities they might be seen only as 
psychological processes (merely human projection), and their 
theological basis would thus be questioned. These questions may 
include: If God really created the laws of nature, are they still laws or 
are they too changeable to be called that? Is God part of these laws, 
part of nature? Is He Himself subject to its laws? These are all 
questions that have on the one hand serious implications for our 
view of God and creation order, but on the other hand, create 
questions about God‟s immanence and creation‟s determinism. 
Part two investigates whether the necessity view (of laws of nature) 
allows some room for God‟s immanence (or divine action) and found 
some possibilities in Watts‟s explanation of probability. Watts states 
that probability is part of necessity, and that it combines an element 
of predictability with an element of openness. This leads to an 
understanding of the universe as open, emergent and free, in con-
trast to the closed, fixed system as the necessity view would have it. 
This outcome again sounds very much like the regularities view of 
laws of nature, but on the other hand it connects very strongly with 
concepts very familiar in process philosophy and theology. The 
pantheistic and (sometimes) unbiblical view of God in process philo-
sophy/theology makes it, however, a dead end for the reformational 
tradition. Therefore, part three focuses on how Trinitarian theology 
(especially that of Robert Jenson) gave more biblical grounds to 
process philosophy and theology (which might include “pan-en-
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trinitarianism”). Regarding who God is, the notion of process theo-
logy might thus be more acceptable, and makes it worthwhile to 
investigate more seriously what the process thought perspective is 
on laws of nature.21  
This leads us to the question of what the status of laws of nature 
consequently is. Can we still speak of creation order as something 
intelligible, and is there a theological basis to it in the simple sense 
that God willed and maintains it (as necessity)? We have seen that if 
the regularities view, or the process view (of openness, emergence 
of the universe) regarding the laws of nature is accepted, we are 
faced with similar difficulties or concerns. Among these concerns are 
the question regarding the necessity of order (as a consequence of 
the disappearance of a Creator who is willing these laws because it 
is all mind-dependent); that order is temporal and in constant 
change (as part of the openness and emergence of creation); and 
that the boundary between God and creation is weakened (with the 
inclination to panentheism). To overcome these concerns an option 
may be to stick to the necessity view of creation order, as the 
reformational tradition did, but this would not sufficiently address the 
problem of God‟s immanence and of emergence in nature. A better 
option will be to accept that necessities include probabilities (as 
Watts suggests). This may have the implication of moving to the 
regularity view, but “lawfulness probably needs to exist in some 
sense in both nature and the human mind before the two can be 
brought together” (Watts, 2008:3). Understood in this way, laws of 
nature do not have to implicate a huge distance between God and 
creation, but rather that God is dynamical and actively involved in 
this open and emerging universe – as process philosophy and 
Jenson suggest. This does not necessarily mean that God is subject 
to the laws of nature in the sense that He is not God anymore 
(regarding his aseity), but rather that God‟s normal actions  
... work within the structure of intelligible regularity, limited 
openness, continuous teleological development, and the inter-
connectedness of objects in a cosmic totality (Ward, 2008b: 
252).  
                                      
21 The importance of the necessary link between process theology and Trinitarian 
theology is highlighted by Pannenberg (2007:33) when he says about Trinitarian 
theology: “Theology that is distinctively Christian will attribute the creation to the 
trinitarian God – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In Christian theology, there is no 
room for a pre-trinitarian monotheism of the one God.” This link is what I tried to 
establish in the third part of this article. 
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This allows for a much more dynamic understanding of God‟s imma-
nence. 
6. Conclusion 
To answer the question investigated by this article regarding the 
future of creation order, I will say that its future is open. It is open in 
the sense that we are all living in an open and emerging universe 
(with the implication of changing laws), but also open in the sense 
that the future is also open to God (as open theists assert).22 Laws 
of nature, or creation order, should thus be understood as much 
more open than it has been traditionally understood in the refor-
mational tradition. This has implications for our view of God as a 
much more dynamic, active and temporal God (in line with Jenson), 
but it does not necessarily need to include a panentheistic view.23 
There are obviously many possible objections to arise from within 
the Trinitarian and reformational theology on this view of creation 
order, as well as on some aspects of Jenson‟s theology (and 
process theology). However, the immanence of God may potentially 
be diminished by such objections. My answer remains consequently 
a preliminary and open one.  
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